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19 September 1974 MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Intelligence Research and Development Council Some Concepts on the Improvement of the "Presentation" Phase of the Intelligence SUBJECT: Process 1. At the 17 August 1974 Council session, 25X1 attending for mentioned some staff research he had conducted for the DCI on the subject of new intelligence presentation means. He stated that he would forward a copy of his work to the Chairman. 2. Per request and with the Chairman's concurrence, copies of this document, as annotated by the DCI, are forwarded to the members for information purposes. 25X1 Executive Secretary Attachment as stated

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1 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

: New Intelligence Presentation Means

This describes the rationale by which I am approaching the subject.

Problem

To discover new approaches to the way in which information media techniques and technology and related ongoing R&D could be employed to extend user and analyst capacity for analyzing, perceiving and understanding intelligence.

Introduction

It has some utility to restate the problem so that through redundancy there is refinement. What I anticipate is that through understanding the relationship among

- 1) the process of organization of concepts, ideas and facts,
- 2) the analytical methods which give new insights to these, and
- 3) the applicability of media techniques and technology,

the Intelligence Community can lessen the impedance

- to the flow of intelligence between analyst and user, and
- to the understanding of the data processor's facts by the analyst.

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These three interact in what I would call a "feasibility equation," which I will describe subsequently. I anticipate that what is being reported here will be a demonstration of the plausibility of the course which is recommended, i.e., the "strategic" view of how to go at solving the "problem." In practice, i.e., "tactically" the problem will be treated by meeting presentation needs in an iterative way on a one-by-one basis -- at least till more sophistication develops regarding "concept transfer" between intellects.

I anticipate also that there will be few, if any, truly unique, optimum solutions to presenting information but that there will be a spectrum of possibilities any one of which might be optimized to the needs of a particular intelligence user or analyst. What ought to develop then if we are successful is

- 1) some primitive approaches to giving really new insights to structually non-trivial concepts and to complicated aggregation of facts, and
- 2) a management approach to satisfying user preferences for gaining those insights when the extant 'bag of tricks' is inadequate.

The essence of developing new means of presentation of intelligence lies, I believe, in the skein that must be found between

- the finished intelligence producer's analytical construct or approach to finding the meaning of facts, and
- the media by which his conclusions can be transmitted to the user.

If the producers use conventional approaches, then conventional use of media will result. If, however, his approaches are conditioned

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by the full capabilities of available media, then the analytical approach itself will foster the new presentation means. skein between facts to be analyzed and intelligence to be presented is to be found -- I assert -- in the analytical methodologies which are employed. In fact, depending upon user or analyst preference many analytical methodologies might link a given set of facts and a given medium of presentation.

To avoid being unremittingly theoretical, there follows a listing of some

- relevant problems of analysis,
- analytical methodologies, and
- media technical capabilities.

Problems of Analysis

Problems of analysis means those kinds of tasks faced in certain offices of CIA, DDI and DDS&T; in DIA, DI and DE; and in State, INR. As other departments of government evolve their understanding of the role which intelligence can play in supporting national interest activities perhaps new tasks or new perspectives of old tasks will develop. Table 1 lists a number of problems, some specific in nature, other general.

All of the problems listed in Table 1 are familiar. All of them suggest or require a quantification of the facts involved. This is a necessity for analytical methodologies any one of which by its nature excludes intuition, i.e., a given set of facts must give rise to results which are invariant as to analyst. One can, of course, change results by changing analytical methods, hypotheses in analyses or in tolerating varying levels of confidence.

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TABLE 1

Problems of Analysis

- 1. Indications and warning "thermometer"
- 2. Weapon systems' measures and portrayal
- 3. Uncertainty measures and portrayal
- 4. Military economics analysis
- 5. Trade-off measures and portrayal
- 6. Crisis situation analysis
- 7. Current intelligence (and cable) dissemination
- 8. Prediction elections, deployments, etc.
- 9. Verification (SALT/MBFR) measures of confidence
- 10. Decision-making process
- 11. Projection of trends
- 12. Succession analysis
- 13. Transaction analysis
- 14. Multi-parameter data analysis

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Analytical Methodologies

Analytical methodologies abound. Table 2 probably only scratches the surface. The table clearly indicates a richness of opportunity for trying new approaches to analysis and therefore perhaps to presentation of results. Some of these methodologies are being employed presently in CIA and DIA, possibly elsewhere in the community. All of these are quantitatively based, most require high-speed computers for practicality, and all have potential for giving new insights to old problems. Some methodologies by their nature will demand new media for meaningful presentation of results, others could permit analysts new, clearer or even differing insights.

Technique and Technology

In my experience -- and from the research I have done in recent weeks -- technique and technology are the least developed or exploited aspects of the feasibility equation, especially with respect to reducing impedance to concept transfer. So far I have tried to discover the "dimensions" of intelligence presentations as a way both of understanding our current means of presentation and of stimulating new means. The parameters which presently appear adequate are five*:

- 1) Fixed or changeable content;
- 2) Symbols vs charts (i.e., digital vs analog);
- 3) Dimensionability (e.g., B&W vs color);
- 4) Static (stationary) vs dynamic display; and
- 5) Interactive capability.

^{*} The number and categorization might change.

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In this listing I have arranged the parameters in a subjective successively "more interesting" rank order. As each is of the nature of a binary (yes, no) choice, any given presentation format can be characterized by a five-digit string of 0's or 1's -- the CIA Seal is "00000" and the speculative combination of Telemetry Analysis Display System (TADS) and a color visual display unit (TV) is "111111." Table 3 is a very primitive attempt at filling in the spectrum of possible presentation means using some current IC products and other well-known information presentation formats.

The main utility of this structuring of presentation means might lie in the discipline it imposes on the study of the problem. There is a great deal of latent capability in the IC for generating new presentation means. The five-digit code can provide a way of understanding what we do now and -- on the basis of the latent capabilities -- what new presentation means are feasible. The appendix to this report contains some unusual means, mainly of the "00111" or less category. Speculation -- based on the five presentation means parameters, conditioned by what is possible with current IC capabilities and by what might be useful to users and analysts -- can give rise to feasible demonstrations.

There is another aspect of presentation which needs consideration. That consideration is with respect to the way in which means of presentation are used. For example, in typical hard copy (00111 or less) various styles are possible, e.g., prose, pre-formatted prose, precis, outline, "one-liner"; various formats are possible, e.g., conventional paragraphing, "bullets," italics, type font hierarchies, etc. I have not yet developed a structural approach to this problem --perhaps only a survey of usage is possible.

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TABLE 3

Presentation Means Taxonomy

Non-inter./Interactiv	Static/Dynamic	B&W/Color	Symbols/Charts	Fixed/Changeable	
0	0	0	0	Q	CIA Seal; Encrypted message ticker
0	0	0	_	1	Letter; Watch Report; AEGIS; audio cassette, SIOP Emer. Action Mess
0	0	0		0 1	NPIC briefing boards; LDX
0	0		0	ō	Traffic sign
0	0			1	Traffic light
0			1		CIA employee badge (one's own)
0	0	1	1	1	CIB; NID; newspaper & magazines; Vu-graph/slides
0	1	0	0	0	
0	1	0	0	1	NYSE ticker; cable
0	1	0	1	0	Video cassette (B&W); Automatic watch
0	1	0	1	1	TV (B&W); ALIAS; radio
0				0	rn 400 11 1 4 4 4 4 11 - 1
0		1		1	Traffic light - computer controlled
0		1		_	Video cassette (color)
0	1	1		1	TV (color) Slide rule
1	0	0	0	0	STARS
1	0		1		
1		0		1	NSA Sigint On-Line Info. Sys. (SOLIS); COINS; QUIKTRAK
ì	0	1	0	0	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
1	0	1	0	1	
J.	C	3.	1	0	
1		1	1	1	•
1	1	0	0	0	
1	1	0	0	1	Telephone
1	1	0			
1	1	0		1	Timer; USN/OSIS; Tele Autograph; Picturephone
1	1	1	0		•
1	1			1	
1	Ţ	1		0	EDTS. TADS. Weather man motions on color TV
1	T	1	1	1	ERTS; TADS; Weather map motions on color TV

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Prognosis

What goes before implies a course of action that the following tries to make specific. That course of action is given by the following relationships:

Problems of Analysis +

Analytical Methodologies +

Technique and Technology =

Feasibility of Presentation Means

Given feasibility, then

Feasibility +

Management Interest ---

Demonstration of Presentation Means

Given judgments as to the utility of demonstration results, then

Demonstration +

User Interest, Need or Demand

Operational Capability

As "management interest" and "user (or analyst) interest" are conditioned in part by taste, my belief is that some presentation means which might at any time be found "uninteresting" would in actuality be only "untimely."

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True, but hour accelerate?

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SOME UNUSUAL "00111" MEANS OF CONVEYING IDEAS


This Appendix is really just a primitive start at a more thorough survey of symbolic, textual and graphical means of conveying ideas. The means are unusual only in the sense that they are not commonly used in Intelligence Community publications. As the illustrations which are used have been borrowed from a large number of sources and are out of context, both of the original source and of possible intelligence context, they suffer somewhat. However, some brief comment is given opposite each as a way of showing some relevance.

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The illustration opposite was produced by cooperation between DDI/OBGI/Cartographic and IC/MPRRG. It is a map of Africa in which dollars expended on intelligence in given countries is displayed in vertical extend above the country. The technique could be applied to any of a number of geographic variables of social, demographic, economic or political activity.

The illustration opposite is typical of perspective in graphic plots. The logo beneath the illustration explains what is being described here; this presentation means might have utility in trying to show the movement of an entity in which three dimensions are significant. One example of this would be the absolute amount of dollar resources which a given country expends on defense and social programs both plotted as a function of time. One might use the same type of plot for descriptions of resources expended on PHOTINT, SIGINT and HUMINT as a function of time in which hash marks for fiscal years could be employed.




THREE-DIMENSIONAL ANALOGUE of the 21-dimensional face-classification system makes each face a point inside or on the surface of a cube. For this simplified illustration three features are judged so that the assigned values become the coordinates of the point three features are judged so that the assigned values become the coordinates and yet representing the face. Face A, for example, has a hair length of 4, eye separation of 3 and the representing the face. Face A, for example, has a hair length of 4, eye separation of 8 in representing the face. Face A, for example, has a hair length of 4, eye separation of 8 in representing the face. Face A, for example, has a hair length of 4, eye separation of 8 in the face of 3. The distinction between any two faces can be measured simply as the classification of the distance face A and is described.

Distribution of 3. The distinction between the 21-dimensional model each point is 21 terms. The distance hetween two points has 21 terms the drawing is (22 + 22 + 12)1/2, or 3. In the distance between two points has 21 terms by 21 coordinates and the equation for the distance hetween two points.

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This illustration opposite is the final example of the use of perspective which might aid in conveying a concept. One might imagine that in some type of operations such a view could be very useful during the preparatory stage.



The New York Times/Anderson Isometric Maps/April 23, 1974
Many injured in the blast lived in Envoy House

ready

The illustration opposite describes a way of producing a newspaper at a distance, and in principle is always in use in the intelligence community through LDX.

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Libe: This leg


the NID to outsid

Moral Con 2

March 22-2 1971 IEEE Special Issue

The Toshiba News






A New Method of Home **News Evaluation**

TELENEWSPAPER AGE DAWNS Toshiba Home Facsimile Unit Promises New Era of Instant Communication

Can Be Mass-produced

for Every Home

The Toshiba System: Compact, Inexpensive




Transmisson Speed: Five Minutes Per Page

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The illustration opposite gives a schematic of some of the branch points in arriving at a decision. If, in regard to the DDI/OPR bayesian estimate of conflict possibility, each analyst were to make a decision tree, then after the fact the use of the decision tree could help them to illustrate their understanding of their colleagues' thinking and a subsequent time-series analysis might indicate significant events which changed thought processes.

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TOP LEVEL



The major benefits to be derived from using the Relevance Tree are summarized as follows:

In laying out the relevance tree structure, the designer arrays state programs and activities according to their contribution to the achievement of the executive's goals. A logical next step in the use of the Relevance Tree would be to relate it by means of a coding scheme, to the functional program structure of the state's budgeting system.

The Relevance Tree permits calculation of the relative amounts of support that the relative amounts of support

The Relevance Tree permits calculation of the relative amounts of support that should be directed to topical sublements that are coveral levels of activity removed from the ultimate goal. This is a powerful tool for use in the direction of efforts in planning, program development, and financial support of state activities.

Relevance Trees can be used to assess the goal directedness of an activity and thereby, to eliminate the constraint of traditional organizational categorizations of activities. Freedom from such constraints can be expected to induce important insights into greater program benefits and to keep the analytical structure from

The illustration opposite was published in the first instance as an unordered and half-redundant matrix of correlation coefficients between entries. The significant half of the matrix was retained and organized according to a mathematical algorithm which caused elements in the spectrum of conflict behavior with mathematical characteristics most alike to be near one another. The result which is color-coded suggests that one might go a further step and with some smoothing techniques draw in contours not unlike a contour map.

The Want out of







TABLE 5. SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR



The illustration opposite makes two points: (1) that there are a variety of unusual graph papers which might aid readers in an understanding of statistical data, and (2) that statistical data can be smoothed somewhat as an aid to an understanding of data. The model opposite summarizes a table which had about 80 entries.



The illustration opposite is a copy of a slide rule which summarizes an important physical effect in strategic weapon systems analysis. It seems possible that in important instances one might include a slide rule in a pocket at the end of an intelligence report as a way of permitting the reader to more fully inform himself on a subject. The slide rule need not be used exclusively for technical data involving physical laws but could be used as well in instances where a curve fit to economic or social data is possible.



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NEXT STEP=0 SKIP TO ABSTRACT #=B//# VIEW NEXT PRGE=A (C)NYTIMES, SEE ABSTRACT FOR YEAR, NONTIMES MATERIAL BY PERMISSION 65: 2 4/WGT 51/LIN 31 NYT/JNL 1973-12-19 72 OF 457910/IDN ANLITOM 353-73-57 É SILK SAYS EVERY AMER CORP WANTS TO KNOW HOW ENERGY CRISIS WILL AFFECT IT; SAYS ECON FORECASTING TEAM HEADED BY F P MURPHY IS MAKING STUDY FOR GE, USING INPUT-OUTPUT MODEL BASED ON WORK OF PROF W W LEONTIEF; STUDY'S PREDICTIONS OF IMPACT ON US ECON OF ARAB OIL EMBARGO ARE BASED ON CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS: THAT ARAB STATE WILL YIELD TO INTENSE PRESSURE AND RESUME OIL SHIPMENTS TO US BY JUNE 174, THAT CURTAILMENT OF OIL SHIPMENTS TO JAPAN AND WESTERN EUR WILL NOT BE ESCALATED FURTHER AND MAY BE EASED, THAT US MONETARY POLICY WILL BE EASED AS THREAT OF RECESSION BECOMES MORE SEVERE THAN CONCERN ABOUT INFLATION AND THAT FED SPENDING WILL INCREASE ENOUGH TO OFFSET FISCAL IMPACT OF ANY TAM INCREASES THAT MAY ARISE FROM FUEL SHORTAGES: CONCLUDES THAT ENERGY CRISIS IS SERIOUS BUT MANAGEABLE; ESTIMATES SHORTFALL OF 2.1 MILLION BBLS DAILY FOR 1ST OR 174, ABOUT 11% LESS THAN NORMAL DEMAND OF 19.5 MILLION BBLS; FORECASTS MORE EXTREME SHORTAGES IN FUEL OILS (BOILER FUEL, DIESEL FUEL AND HEATING OIL), WHICH IT SAYS WILL FALL 21% SHORT OF DEMAND; ESTIMATES THAT MFG SECTOR OF ECON AS WHOLE WILL SUFFER DEFICIT OF 14% OF ITS NORMAL FUEL OIL REQUIREMENTS IN 1ST QR 174, WITH LARGER SHORTFALL IN NEW ENGLAND, 30%, AND MIDDLE ATLANTIC STATES, 20%; SAY LACK OF RAIL CARS, BARGES, SHIPS, STORAGE TANKS AND UNLOADING FACILITIES WILL LIMIT TRANSSHIPMENTS OF ANY OIL SURPLUSES THAT MAY BECOME AVAILABLE: CANNOT SAY HOW MUCH FUEL MATION'S MFRS HAVE HOARDED AND CAN USE TO KEEP PLANTS OPERATING IF OIL SUPPLIES RUN LOWER THAN EXPECTED; PREDICT 4%

MEXT STEP=C VIEW NEXT PAGE=A SKIP TO ABSTRACT #=8//# (C)NYTIMES, SEE ABSTRACT FOR YEAR, NONTIMES MATERIAL BY PERMISSION DROP IN INDUS PRODUCTION FROM OCT 173 TO JUNE 174, WITH 17, 1% DROP IN NEW ENGLAND; EXPECTS UNEMPLOYMENT TO INCREASE TO 6.4% BY 2D OR 174 AND RATE OF INFLATION TO AVG TO 6.4% COMPARED WITH 5.1M FORECAST BEFORE ARAB EMBARGO: SAYS OUTPUT OF MAJOR APPLIANCES WILL DECLINE BY ALMOST 1.6% IN 2D OR 174 AND BY 8.8% FOR 174 AS A WHOLE; PREDICTS THAT CORP PROFITS WILL BE OFF SHARPLY, BUT NOT DISASTROUSLY; ESTIMATES 4TH QR GAIN IN GE PROFITS OVER 172 QR, BUT ANTICIPATES VIRTUALLY NO GAIN FOR 1ST OR OF 174 AND PROFIT DECLINES OF 11.1% FOR 2D OR, 14.8% FOR 3D OR AND 15.4% FOR 4TH; SEES DISTURBING INFLATIONARY PATTERN IN 1ST HALF OF 174, PREDICTING CONSUMER PRICES TO CLIMB AT ANNUAL RATE OF 8.5% IN 1ST QR, 7.7% IN 2D QR AND BY 7% IN 174 AS WHOLE: SAYS SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES SHOULD FALL STEADILY AS YR PREGRESSES, WITH COMMERCIAL-PAPER RATES ESTIMATED TO DECLINE FROM 9.5% IN CURRENT OR TO 7.4% IN 1ST OR 174/ GRADUALLY DECLINING FURTHER TO 6% BY END OF YR) ON BASIS OF RELATIVELY HOPEFUL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT MID-174 END OF ARAB OIL EMBARGO, GE ECONOMISTS EXPECT IMPACT OF ENERGY CRISIS ON PRODUCTION TO BE STEEP, SHORT AND HIGHLY SELECTIVE, WITH HEAVIEST DAMAGE TO CONSUMER OUTLAYS AND I US SPENDING, ESPECIALLY ON JARS, TRUCKS HND TRANSPARPEOVED FOR Release 2004/10/28 SCIASEDP 80/M01082A000290150011160 EXTENDED THROUGHOUT 174, ECON WOULD GO INTO DEEP RECESSION, هروا والمراجع والمراع

The illustration opposite is an AEGIS prinout to a specific question (one involving Wassily Leontief). Such a format is a start forward possibly either in hardcopy as displayed or on suitable visual display units.

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